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Abstract
This paper examines the determinants and margins of profit shifting through trans-
fer pricing. We develop a theory model, where transfer pricing patterns are governed
by a generalized concealment cost function (CCF). Our empirical analysis draws on
micro-level data about transaction-level imports, firm-level characteristics, as well as tax
differentials between regions in Switzerland and countries abroad. We find, both theo-
retically and empirically, that more productive multinational firms deviate less from the
arms’ length price and trade lower quantities, compared to MNEs with lower produc-
tivity. Moreover, the decision of firms to engage in transfer pricing depends negatively
on a fixed cost component in the CCF, as well as trade costs. The model allows us to
estimate a theory-consistent concealment cost function, which can be used for counter-
factual analysis.
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1 Introduction
Tax harmonization and compliance initiatives have been prominent on the international in-
stitutional agenda in recent years. Several bilateral and multilateral tax-authority initiatives
– in particular the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting package (BEPS) – aim at
collaborating on the matter of tax avoidance, which multinational enterprises (MNE) have
been repeatedly accused of.
In this paper, we provide novel evidence on the forces that govern the patterns of transfer
pricing, one of the main instruments for profit shifting. We define as the transfer price the
price that MNEs set for intra-firm transactions of physical goods, compared to an arm’s
length price (ALP) for a transfer between independent parties. Intra-firm transfers create
leeway for shifting profits for tax avoidance motives, and previous literature has indeed
found evidence for transfer mispricing (see Bernard et al., 2006; Cristea and Nguyen, 2016;
Davies et al., 2018; Liu et al., 2017). However, the factors that foster transfer mispricing
have not been entirely disentangled. Specifically, research on (i) the question, which factors
determine the decision of firms to engage in transfer pricing, i.e., the extensive margin, (ii)
the extent of profits shifted, i.e., the intensive margin, and (iii) different transfer pricing
strategies – firms may shift a given amount of profits to locations with lower corporate tax
rates by either shipping small volumes at prices vastly different from the competitive ALP,
by shipping large quantities at prices very similar to the ALP, or by any combination of
the two – is scarce. We argue that firm heterogeneity is crucial in explaining these different
factors. This is especially relevant for the trade-off between choosing a transaction quantity
and the deviation of the transfer price from the ALP, which is involved in a firm’s profit
optimization problem. In this regard, we investigate the effect of firm heterogeneity in terms
of productivity, transportation costs, and the difference in corporate income tax rates, on
import prices and quantities, utilizing data about the universe of import transactions to a
tax haven, Switzerland.
We contribute to previous literature by generalizing the concealment cost function and
proposing a theory framework, in which transfer prices deviate from arm’s length prices
for a tax avoidance motive.1 Moreover, we introduce firm heterogeneity in terms of produc-
tivity in our theoretical model of transfer pricing to examine the determinants of transfer
pricing along extensive and intensive margins of transfer pricing. Next, the model allows
for a theory-consistent estimation of concealment cost function parameters, which can be
1Concealment costs are the costs that arise due to engaging in transfer pricing, i.e., paying accountants,
dealing with tax authorities, etc.
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used for counter-factual analysis within our model framework. Analyzing how variations in
tax differentials, trade costs, or trade policy instruments affect tax evasion or limit transfer
pricing might be an important policy tool. In our empirical analysis, we employ detailed
information about the universe of Swiss firm-level manufacturing import transactions be-
tween 2006 and 2015. This dataset offers several benefits. Due to low corporate taxes and
a favorable economic and institutional environment with generous tax privileges for certain
legal forms, Switzerland is a highly attractive location for foreign-owned MNEs. At the
same time, Switzerland is a major location for domestically owned MNEs (for an overview
see Egger and Koethenbuerger, 2016). Second, we use name matching to separate intra-firm
transactions from ALP transactions within firms. Thus, in contrast to the recent literature
on transfer pricing focussing on variation across countries, we are able to exploit the vari-
ation within a firm to clearly identify mispricing. Third, we are able to exploit both the
variation in corporate income tax rates across local jurisdictions in Switzerland and across
exporter countries to determine how tax differentials affect profit shifting. The focus on
a single importer country allows us to hold pricing-to-market and other general importer
conditions constant. We also include transportation costs to explain the behavior of MNEs
with regard to transfer pricing. Lastly, quantifying the extent of transfer mispricing helps to
understand the direction and pattern of global trade flows, and to which extent variations
in corporate taxes drive trade those patterns.
Similar to Davies et al. (2018) we develop a theoretical model in which transfer pricing is
explicitly governed by concealment costs, assuming that firms misprice internal transactions
because they aim at avoiding taxes. Firms produce differentiated goods and have monopoly
power for their variety. They either produce the inputs needed for the differentiated good
themselves in the domestic country, or they import them from a foreign affiliate. The latter
makes profit shifting possible. They thereby face three restrictions to engage in transfer
pricing. First, concealment costs have a fixed component and are increasing in the deviation
from the competitive price as well as the traded quantity of goods. Second, as inputs have to
be used in the production process, there is an implicit maximum of inputs that can be used
without cannibalizing the domestic monopoly profits. Third, high trade costs might render
transfer pricing infeasible, especially for small tax differentials. We find that there exists
a certain productivity threshold for firms to engage in profit shifting, which is due to the
fixed cost component in the concealment cost function and varies between countries due to
country-pair-specific iceberg trade costs. While higher fixed costs are intuitively associated
with decreased entry, the role of trade costs is more subtle. Firms will only shift profits if
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the gains from profit shifting (in terms of net profits) are sufficiently large to compensate for
transportation costs. On the one hand, the net gains from transfer pricing depend on the
tax differential – the larger it is, the greater are the potential gains. On the other hand, the
costs of transfer pricing increase with transportation costs as goods need to be physically
traded to be able to exploit the tax differential. This implies that a trade cost-adjusted tax
differential matter. Very high levels of trade cost can even become prohibitive for transfer
pricing. Thus, the global decline of transportation costs might play a significant role in the
rise of transfer pricing. To this extent, the extensive margin in our theoretical model does
not solely depend on the uniform fixed cost component of the concealment cost function, but
in a bilateral way on the transportation costs of goods.
The proposed theoretical model is consistent with several empirical facts we observe in the
data. In line with previous evidence and conditioning on a host of fixed effects that control
for factors such as differences in the price and quantity of imports specific to firms as well as
products, that an increase in the tax differential with a higher-tax country of origin by one
percentage point leads to about 0.4% lower transfer prices of transactions from that origin,
relative to arm’s length prices of the same importer firm located in Switzerland. The effect
on quantities is positive and amounts to about 2.4%. For imports from countries that have
lower tax rates, the effect is reversed. We find that the intra-firm transaction price increases
by about 0.8% and the quantity decreases by about 5.5%, compared to transactions at arm’s
length, of a given firm. We also find that more productive MNEs deviate less from the ALP
and ship lower quantities than less productive ones, as the tax differential becomes larger.
Given the substantial average tax differentials that importers in Switzerland face, the results
are quantitatively important. They are also quantitatively and qualitatively robust to a
number of robustness checks.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the related literature. Section 3
provides an overview of corporate taxation in Switzerland. Section 4 outlines the theoretical
model. In section 5 we describe the data and the empirical estimation strategy. Finally,
section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
A large strand of the public finance literature focuses on profit shifting (see Huizinga and
Laeven, 2008; Schindler and Schjelderup, 2016; Dharmapala, 2014), as well as channels
through which MNEs reduce their corporate tax payments. Torslov et al. (2018) estimate
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that close to 40% of all MNEs profits are shifted to tax havens each year. Focussing on
firm level data, evidence has shown that MNEs avoid taxation by shifting profits to low tax
countries (e.g. Clausing, 2009; Dyreng et al., 2012; Dharmapala and Riedel, 2013; Egger et
al., 2014). For instance, the results in Egger et al. (2010) suggest that, among European
firms, the absolute tax payments of MNEs are lower than those of comparable firms that only
operate domestically. The main instruments used for profit shifting are transfer pricing (see
Bernard et al., 2006; Davies et al., 2018), debt shifting (see Egger et al., 2014), and royalty
payments (see Karkinsky and Riedel, 2012; Griffith et al., 2014 among others). Bernard et
al. (2006) and Davies et al. (2018) have shown for the US and France, respectively, that
deviations of the transfer price from ALP are related to differences in taxes. The former find
that the price wedge depends on product differentiation, firm size, market power, destination-
country tax rates, and import tariffs for MNEs in the US, and the latter show that the biggest
French MNEs consistently use price transfers.
These findings imply that transfer pricing is an important instrument for multinational firms’
tax avoidance practices, and that intensive local multinational activity creates some leeway
for profit shifting. The OECD (2010) states the problem underlying the use of transfer
prices as a vehicle for profit shifting: "When independent enterprises deal with each other,
the conditions of their commercial and financial relations (e.g., the price of goods transferred
or services provided and the conditions of the transfer or provision) ordinarily are determined
by market forces. When associated enterprises deal with each other, their commercial and
financial relations may not be directly affected by external market forces in the same way."
Indeed MNEs may use sophisticated methods, for instance, by engaging in manipulation of
the arm’s length price to conceal deviations in the transfer price (Cristea and Nguyen, 2016)
for tax reasons. Even without mispricing intent, Bauer and Langenmayr (2013) argue that
MNEs are more productive and hence the marginal cost for an intra-firm transaction is lower
than that of an independently sourced input. Additionally, the latter involves a bargaining
mark-up, which can make it relatively more expensive. In Keuschnigg and Devereux (2013),
financial frictions distort the transfer price. All these factors render the empirical analysis
of transfer pricing practices difficult. The next section discusses the institutional setup in
Switzerland that fosters profit shifting, in particular transfer pricing.
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3 Corporate Taxes and Profit Shifting in Switzerland
The topic of tax-induced profit shifting of MNEs is a highly debated one, having substantial
quantitative implications with respect to the potential losses for national tax authorities. For
instance, the Australian Administrative Appeals Tribunal decided in 2008 that Roche Prod-
ucts Pty Limited Australia, a subsidiary of Roche Holdings Ltd of Basel, Switzerland had
overpaid 45 million dollar for its ethical pharmaceutical products to Roche Basel (Switzer-
land) between 1993 and 2003.
Switzerland has a residence-based corporate tax system such that companies are subject to
corporate income tax on worldwide income, with the exception of income attributable to
foreign permanent establishments or foreign immobile property. Low corporate tax rates in
general and privileged taxation of holding companies, administrative companies and mixed
companies on a cantonal level (similar to US state level) in Switzerland as well as its repu-
tation as a tax haven, provide an incentive for MNEs to use transfer pricing, among other
methods, in order to avoid taxes. Although the privileged taxation is supposed to be abol-
ished through a current corporate tax reform to be put in place by 2018 or 2019, the period
under consideration in this paper still falls under current practices.2
– Table 1 about here –
Table 1 summarizes the 26 Swiss cantonal corporate profit tax rates for incorporated com-
panies in 2015. These data represent the tax burden in percent calculated by the Swiss Tax
Administration for each of the 26 cantonal capitals. It is evident that the variation in tax
rates is large, and the lowest rates apply in central Switzerland, with an average corporate
tax rate of little more than 12 percent in the canton of Nidwalden. The highest tax rates
apply in Western Switzerland and Basle, amounting to about 25 percent in Geneva. The
average tax rate is 18.4 percent in 2015, and 19.5 percent across all years between 2006 and
2015.
Profits are supposed to be taxed in the location in which the value added was generated. In
general market forces present in transactions between two independent firms should enforce
the aforementioned principle. Thus, transactions between two independent firms should be
priced at arm’s length. In contrast, multinational firms may exploit a lack of market forces
(within the firm) to shift profits to low tax countries by pricing this internal transactions
2Tax privileges for MNEs will be substituted by a decrease in corporate tax rates as well as other benefits
more in line with the OECD BEPS package. This includes improved bilateral and multilateral cooperation
to diminish profit shifting. In addition, bank secrecy for foreign clients will be abolished at around the same
time, hence it is questionable whether Switzerland can be considered a tax haven in the future.
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different from the ALP. This involves undercharging for inputs sourced from affiliated firms
located in high tax countries, and/or overcharging inputs supplied from affiliated firms in low
tax countries. The identification of mispriced transactions is thus empirically challenging.
Comparable goods may not be available in the data, especially for specialized industries
such as the pharmaceutical industry, which is an important sector for the Swiss economy
and a highly regulated market, including the regulation of prices.3 Accordingly it is not
peculiar per se, that transfer prices deviate from arm’s length prices. The characteristics
of institutions in Switzerland and a unique dataset about Swiss trade transactions and firm
information, together with a theoretical model laid out in the next section, which establishes
a framework for the empirical estimation in the subsequent chapters, allow us to overcome
many of the challenges present in previous work. Still Switzerland is a small open economy
with a diverse import and export structure, which allows us to investigate transactions on a
highly disaggregated level. Moreover, Switzerland is one of a few tax havens that is actually
capable of processing larger amounts of imports, which is very relevant for transfer pricing
of physical good transactions. Last, but not least, the Swiss customs data is of high quality.
4 Model
In this section we provide a model of transfer pricing between two affiliated firms located in
two generic countries indicated by i = d, f , where d indicates the domestic country and f the
foreign country. Without loss of generality we write the model from the perspective of a firm
in the domestic country that potentially has affiliates in the foreign country. Both countries
differ in their corporate tax rates, τi ∈ [0, 1], which will create incentives to shift profits
between the two affiliated entities. We assume that firms are heterogeneous in terms of their
productivity, φ, which is drawn from a known distribution. Firms in the domestic country
produce differentiated goods indexed by ω. For simplicity we assume that the differentiated
goods can only be produced and consumed locally in the domestic country, but firms are
able to use inputs either produced by domestic affiliate and/or import inputs provided by
a foreign affiliate. The foreign affiliate does not produce any differentiated goods and its
sole purpose is to decrease the effective tax rate of the domestic firm.4 We denote inputs
provided by the domestic entity by xd and foreign inputs by xf . Both inputs are perfect
3The Swiss pharmaceutical industry contributes about 6% to the Swiss GDP and accounts for about 30%
of exports.
4Allowing for foreign production and even trade in differentiated goods, as in Helpman et al. (2004) does
not change the analysis, but greatly increases the model complexity as it introduces further entry cutoffs and
makes aggregation more difficult.
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substitutes in the production process of the differentiated goods. Profit shifting by transfer
pricing arises from the fact that an input can be imported from a foreign affiliated firm and
its price can be set differently from the market price.
Concealment costs
If a firm decides to source inputs from a foreign affiliated firm, it may engage in transfer
mispricing, i.e., shifting profits towards the country with the lower corporate tax rate. As in
Davies et al. (2018) firms can shift profits towards low tax countries by exporting (importing)
intermediate inputs above (below) the market price. As this kind of mispricing usually
violates tax laws, the firm incurs concealment costs. These costs might include paying
transfer pricing accountants, preparing documentation, and legal fees.
Depending on the tax differentials firms either want to import goods below or above the
arms’ length price. Thus, we specify two generalized concealment cost functions: (i) one in
which the foreign firm undercharges their inputs, i.e., the corporate tax rate in the domestic
country is lower than in the foreign country, and (ii) one for a foreign firms that overcharges,
i.e., the foreign corporate tax rate is lower than the domestic one.
In our model, concealment costs consist of two parts: a variable part and a fixed part. The
firm has to pay some fixed cost, FU and FO, if the firm uses undercharging or overcharging,
respectively. The variable part depends positively on the difference between the transfer
price and the competitive price, and the total amount of goods shipped. If the transfer price
and the competitive price differ significantly, the firm may be audited by the tax authority
and needs to justify this difference, which increases costs. If a firm exports large quantities,
this can imply greater profit shifting and tax authorities might demand more documentation,
i.e., greater exports/imports might raise the suspicion of tax authorities.5 The concealment
costs for undercharging transfer pricing are
(pA − pU )αxβf + FU , (1)
where pU is the undercharging price of an internal transaction, which is lower than the
competitive price pA, and β, α ≥ 0. If the firm overcharges, i.e., the transfer price of input
5In theory greater quantities might lower the concealment costs due to economies of scale, i.e., in out
model the β parameter could be negative. We neglect this possibility as the empirical evidence later show
that β > 0.
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pO is higher than the competitive market price, the concealment costs are
(pO − pA)αxβf + FO. (2)
In contrast to Cristea and Nguyen (2016) firms take the competitive arms’ length price as
given. Thus, instead of strategically setting pA and pU (pO) to reduce concealment costs,
the firm only sets the price wedge between the arms’ length price and the internal transfer
price pU or pO by choosing the optimal pU and pO, respectively.6
Utility
Due to our model setup it is sufficient to consider only the demand for the differentiated
good in the domestic country. We assume that individuals (in the domestic country) have
linear-quadratic preferences as in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008):
U = q0 + e
∫
ω∈Ω
q(ω)dω − 12b
(∫
ω∈Ω
q(ω)dω
)2
− 12c
∫
ω∈Ω
q(ω)2dω, (3)
where q0 is a numeraire, q(ω) is the quantity of a differentiated good ω from a set Ω of
available goods in the domestic country, and e, b, and c are positive constants. The aggregate
market demand is
p(ω) = e− b
∫
ω∈Ω
q(ω)dω − cq(ω), (4)
where we assume that the mass of individuals in the economy is normalized to one. We
define the aggregate price of all products as
P ≡
∫
ω∈Ω
p(ω)dω, (5)
and hence
P ≡
(
e− b
∫
ω∈Ω
q(ω)dω
)
M − c
∫
ω∈Ω
q(ω)dω, (6)
where M ≡ ∫ω∈Ω dω is equal to the total number of products in the economy. Then we can
write
∫
ω∈Ω q(ω)dω = eM−Pc+bM , and the (aggregate) demand for a product ω is linear and given
by
p(ω) = E − cq(ω), (7)
6In the Appendix A we show that very similar concealment cost functions can be derived using an optimal
acting tax authority that maximizes expected fines.
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where E ≡ ec+bPc+bM . Without loss of generality we normalize c to one.
Firms
Firms face monopolistic competition in their goods market as in standard Krugman (1980)
and Melitz (2003) models. Each differentiated good ω is produced using domestic inputs
xd and/or foreign inputs xf , which are perfect substitutes in the production process. All
domestic parent firms have the same technology to produce the differentiated goods using
the two inputs:
y(ω) = xf + xd. (8)
Firms are heterogeneous in terms of the productivity to produce inputs, xd and xf . Their
input productivity, φ, is drawn from a known distribution with cumulative density function
G(φ). We assume that firms can produce one unit of input xd and xf , respectively at costs
1/φ in both countries. As the productivity of foreign affiliates and the domestic parent firm
is the same, there is no reason for firms to source any input from abroad. Thus, in this
stylized model input sourcing from abroad will be exclusively driven by tax considerations.7
In our basic model two types of firms exists. First, a firm that only sources domestically.
Second, a firm that sources from a foreign affiliate, but at a price below (above) the arm’s
length price, i.e., it uses transfer mispricing to shift profits to locations with lower tax rates.
Domestic sourcing firm
Net profits of a firm that only operates domestically, sources its inputs domestically, and
sells its differentiated good in the domestic market, are:
pid(ω) = (1− τd)
(
p(ω)y(ω)− xd
φ
)
− F, (9)
where we use that for an exclusively domestically sourcing firm, y(ω) = xd. F denotes fixed
7We could allow firms to have two independent draws from the G(φ) distribution, the first one for the
domestic productivity, φd, the second one for the foreign productivity φf . Thus, G(φd > φf ) gives the
probability of domestic sourcing without the possibility of transfer pricing, where  ≥ 1 are iceberg trade
costs. Introducing transfer pricing will alter this relationship. The tax differential between the domestic and
foreign country might render imported inputs more profitable. Thus, the foreign productivity draw necessary
for importing might be lower, and everything else equal more firms will import from foreign affiliates. Or
the fixed costs component of the concealment cost function are so high that φ

< φˆ, where φˆ is necessary
productivity of a firm to use transfer pricing. In this case we have three types of firm: (i) firms that only source
domestically, with the lowest productivity, (ii) firms that source from abroad but at ALP, with intermediate
productivity, and (iii) firms that import from the foreign country at a price lower (higher) than the arm’s
length price. This would introduce more cutoffs for firms without adding much more insights.
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setup costs. The (internal) costs of the firm for its inputs is 1/φ. Because each firm has a
monopoly in its market, the demand for inputs xd is given by
xd =
Eφ− 1
2φ , (10)
which is increasing in φ. Then the necessary productivity to cover the fixed setup cost F
and to enter the domestic market is given by
φ ≥
(
E − 2
√
F
1− τd
)−1
. (11)
Undercharging MNE
Assuming that the domestic tax rate is lower than the foreign tax rate, τd < τf . In this case
firms want to shift profits from the foreign high-tax country towards the domestic low-tax
country. Thus, the firm will import intermediate inputs below the arms’ length price, i.e.,
undercharge. Total consolidated (foreign and domestic) net profits of the firm are:
piU (ω) =(1− τd)
(
p(ω)y(ω)− xd
φ
− pU xf
)
+(1− τf )
(
pU − 1
φ
)
xf − (1− τf )(pA − pU )αxβf − FU − F,
(12)
where gross profits generated by the domestic entity are revenues less domestically produced
inputs and undercharged foreign input costs. The gross profits (losses) of the foreign entity
are the revenues from the undercharged exports less the production costs. The term (pA −
pU )αxβf−FU reflects the concealment costs, which further decrease consolidated profits. Note
that the fixed setup costs, F , are not deductible. We assume that the concealment costs are
paid by the entity with the higher tax rate to even further decrease profits in the high-tax
location.8 If a firm wants to use foreign imports (to make use of transfer pricing), they face
iceberg trade costs  ≥ 1. These trade costs imply a constraint to shift profits, i.e., the net
profit gains of transfer pricing must be sufficiently high to pay for the fixed costs, FU , and
the inefficiency created by the presence of iceberg trade costs.
We use the fact that firms have monopoly power and that y(ω) = xd +xf , to derive the first
8Tax authorities in high-tax countries are more likely to investigate shifted profits, while low-tax countries
actually gain tax revenues from the profit shifting. Thus, it makes sense to assume that the documentation
and legal fees occur in the high-tax country.
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order conditions of the firm’s maximization problem:
∂pi(ω)U
∂xd
=0 → E − 2(xd + xf )− 1
φ
= 0,
∂pi(ω)U
∂xf
=0 → (1− τd) (E − 2(xd + xf )− pU ) + (1− τf )
(
pU − 1
φ
)
− (1− τf )(pA − pU )αβxβ−1f = 0,
∂pi(ω)U
∂pU
=0 → −(1− τd)xf + (1− τf )xf + (1− τf )α(pA − pU )α−1xβf = 0.
The optimal undercharging price, pU , is given by
pU =
α
β − α
(
β
α
pA − τf − τd
φζ
)
, (13)
where ζ = (1−τd)− (1−τf ) is the trade costs adjusted tax differential. Note that if τd < τf
and  ≥ 1, then ζ > 0.
In order to shift profits, the undercharging price needs to satisfy 0 ≤ pU ≤ 1φ . The first
inequality rules out negative prices, the second inequality states that the undercharging price
must be smaller than the cost of the affiliate, 1φ , otherwise no profits would been shifted.
While the second inequality always holds, given that pA = 1φ ,  ≥ 1 and α > β, the first
inequality constrains firms’ pricing behavior. If pA = 1φ and α > β, we need ζ <
α
β (τf − τd)
to ensure that 0 ≤ pU . Solving the inequality for  yields:
 ≤ α
β
τf − τd
1− τd +
1− τf
1− τd , (14)
where the right hand side (RHS) is always greater than 1. Notice that the RHS is increasing
in τd and decreasing in τf , i.e., increasing the tax differential between the two countries
makes undercharging more feasible. Intuitively, if transportation costs are too high relative
to the tax differential, the firm wants to set a negative price to be able to shift profits, i.e.,
the exporter is actually paying the importer for the intermediate goods. We assume that this
extreme case of transfer pricing is not possible. Figure 1 shows the graphical relationship
described in equation (14). For too high  no transfer pricing is feasible, and the threshold
increases with the tax differential, δτ .
– Figure 1 about here –
We assume for the moment that E is sufficiently large to ensure that xd and xf are non-
negative in equilibrium, i.e., we are in an interior solution in which firms use both foreign
and domestic inputs. Additionally, assuming that  is sufficiently small, such that for a firm
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with given productivity, φ, the undercharging price is positive, and α > β, we can show that
∂(pA − pU )/∂φ < 0, ∂(pA − pU )/∂ > 0,
∂(pA − pU )/∂τf > 0, ∂(pA − pU )/∂τd < 0.
Thus, more productive firms charge lower prices, but deviate less from the competitive price.
On the other hand firm deviate more if the tax differential is greater, holding productivity
constant. Higher trade costs increase the price wedge. Importantly, the undercharging price
actually declines with productivity, i.e.,
∂pU/∂φ < 0.
This stands in sharp contrast to the finding that the price wedge declines with productivity.
As firms become more productive, their arm’s length price declines, given that pA = 1/φ.
Still the undercharging price declines less relative to pA.
Similarly, we derive the optimal traded quantity as
xUf =
(
(1− τd)− (1− τf )
(1− τf )α(pA − pU )α−1
) 1
β−1
. (15)
Substituting the optimal undercharging price, pU , from equation (13) yields
xUf =
 (1− τd)− (1− τf )
(1− τf )α
(
α
α−β
(
pA − τf−τdφζ
))α−1

1
β−1
. (16)
Assuming that pA = 1φ , an interior solution, (xf , xd > 0), and α > β > 1, it can be shown
that ∂xUf /∂φ > 0. Thus, bigger (more productive) firms trade more goods. Moreover, we
find that
∂xUf /∂τf > 0, ∂xUf /∂τd < 0, ∂xUf /∂ < 0.
Every thing else equal, a higher foreign tax rate (higher tax differential) incentivizes a firm
trade more goods to shift profits. Moreover firm deviate more from the competitive price,
thus total profits shifted increase with the tax differential. Given that α > β and an inte-
rior solution, more productive firms will deviate less from the arms’ length price and instead
use more quantity. With increasing productivity firms substitute price deviation for quantity.
Overcharging MNE
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In the Appendix B we explicitly derive the analogous expression for an overcharging MNE.
The overcharging price is given by
pO =
β
β − α
(
pA +
α
β
τd − τf
φζ
)
. (17)
Note that the overcharging price has to be higher than the arms’ length price, which is the
case if ζ ≤ 0. Solving for  we get an analogous condition to equation (14) for the feasibility
of profit shifting in the presence of iceberg trade costs:
 <
1− τf
1− τd , (18)
where the RHS is greater than one as τd > τf . In Figure 1 the left side shows the relationship
given by equation (18). Similarly,  must be sufficiently small to make overcharging feasible
and this threshold increases with the absolute tax differential.
The optimal quantity in the overcharging case is
xOf =
( (1− τf )− (1− τd)
(1− τd)α(pO − pA)α−1
) 1
β−1
. (19)
Binding non-negativity constraint
Also the assumption that E is sufficiently large to ensure that xd, xf > 0 might seem trivial,
yet it has important implications for the model. If the domestic demand for firm’s differenti-
ated good is small, only limited amounts of inputs can be used in the production. This limits
the profit shifting capabilities of a firm. If profit shifting is optimal and E is not sufficiently
large, we are in a corner solution with xd = 0. In this case the firm will source all its inputs
from abroad, still maximizing local profits, i.e., the firm behaves like a monopolist in the
domestic market and does not cannibalize its monopoly profits. Thus, the optimal inputs
with a binding non-negativity constraint on xd are given by
x˜f =
(
φE − 
2φ
)
. (20)
The first order condition becomes
∂pi(ω)U
∂pU
= 0 → −(1− τd)+ (1− τf ) + (1− τf )α(pA − pU )α−1xˆβ−1f = 0,
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which implies that ∂(pA−pU )∂φ > 0. More productive firms deviate more from the arms’ length
price. The only possibility to shift more profits is to change the price wedge, e.g., lower pU .
Moreover, for constraint firms we will not observe any quantity adjustments, as they always
use the maximum amounts of inputs. Thus, firm’s with a binding non-negativity constraint
will introduce a downward bias in the price difference estimation and in the quantity esti-
mation. To this extend our estimates will be lower bounds.
Extensive margin
Firms face two constraints when using transfer pricing for reasons of tax avoidance. First,
the transfer price has to satisfy the two conditions given by equations (14) and (18), de-
picted in Figure 1. Only if the iceberg trade costs are below the line, transfer pricing (over-
or undercharging) will be feasible. The part to the left of the kink corresponds to the over-
charging case, i.e., τf ≤ τd, while the right-hand side gives the undercharging condition. The
depicted relationship is independent of φ, as we assume the arm’s length price to be equal
to 1φ . Clearly, transfer mispricing is more feasible the greater tax differential, as the upper
limit of trade cost increases in the right and left tail.
Second, firms have to recover the fixed costs. Specifically, in the case of undercharging the
additional profits of transfer pricing less the concealment costs and total trade costs must
exceed the fixed costs, FU . Equation (21) states this relationship:
(τf − τd)xUf (pA − PU )− (1− τf )(pA − pU )α(xUU )β − (1− τf )(− 1)xUf pU ≥ FU , (21)
where the first part of the left-hand side (LHS) gives the additional (net) profits due to profit
shifting, the middle part represents the reduction of (net) profits due to the variable costs of
undercharging, and the last part are the (net) additional iceberg transportation costs a firm
faces. Moreover, the LHS increases with φ, thus there is a cutoff value φˆ for which firms will
start to use transfer pricing. i.e., the above inequality holds with equality. We substitute the
optimal undercharging price and import quantities from equation (13) and (16), respectively.
Equation (21) cannot be solved explicitly for φˆ. Using the implicit function theorem, we find
that φˆ, decreases with the tax differential and increases with transportation costs, as well as
fixed costs of transfer pricing.
Corollary
The specific concealment cost function in the model yields some interesting and testable
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predictions. Given an interior solution, α > β > 1, and trade costs sufficiently low the
following model predictions arise:
1. The necessary productivity of firms to engage in transfer mispricing increases with the
fixed costs of transfer mispricing and per piece trade costs, and decreases with the tax
differential.
2. The optimal quantity shipped of transfer mispriced goods depends negatively on the
iceberg trade costs, and positively on the tax differential.
3. The optimal price wedge is inversely related to the quantity traded, thus more goods
are traded at prices more similar to the arm’s length price.
5 Empirical analysis
5.1 Data
We combine several micro-level and aggregate data for Switzerland. First, we use the universe
of Swiss import transactions in the manufacturing sector between 2006 and 2015, provided
by the Swiss Federal Customs Administration EZV (Oberzolldirektion).9 These contain in-
formation about the CIF (including cost, insurance and freight) transaction volumes and
quantities, the 8-digit product category (Tarifnummer) based on the HS classification, the
country of origin, and the name of both the importer and the exporter, as well as the lo-
cation at the level of zipcodes of the importer. The availability of volumes and quantities
allows us to construct CIF unit values, which serve as the proxy for the transaction-specific
mark-up. Note that firms are not identified by a unique identification number but only based
on name and location characteristics, hence a string search algorithm was applied in order
to identify firms.10 Next, Stata’s reclink2 command was used to identify pair-relationships,
i.e., affiliates or parent companies based on the name and country of origin of the importer
or exporter, respectively. As not all affiliated or holding companies carry the same name
as the Swiss firm, this results in conservative estimates throughout the next section. Sec-
ond, we have matched these data to information about firm-level characteristics such as
9We abstain from using export data, because the data about export transactions represent only a fraction
of export sales. Furthermore, they would not allow us to hold characteristics related to Switzerland constant.
10We thereby treated firms with several locations in Switzerland as separate entities. The search process
was complicated by an undefined number of firm and location spellings, and it was computationally expensive
because of the large sample size. We have reduced the burden by conditioning on the canton for Swiss firms
and on the country of origin for foreign firms, and by matching strings that shared the same first character.
The search was implemented by using the Stata plugin strgroup.
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the number of employees, the NACE affiliation, operating revenue and capital stock from
Bureau van Dijk’s Amadeus database.11 These data are used to calculate log productivity
based on Petrin et al. (2004). The free variable is the log number of employees, the proxy
we use is the firm’s total import volume, capital is taken from the balance sheet, and we
use gross operating turnover as the dependent variable. We also deflate the variables using
the producer price indices from the production accounts (national accounts) of the Swiss
statistical office (BFS), of the respective industry the firm is affiliated with.12 Note that this
substantially decreases the number of available observations, for which firm-level information
is available. Third, we use cantonal corporate profit tax rates, which are matched to the
canton the importer is located in. These data are summarized in Table 1 and described in
Section 3.13 These may represent upper bounds, as the tax rates for holdings summarized
in Appendix Table 6 show. We will account for this in Section 5.4 accordingly. Fourth, we
use comprehensive data for corporate profit tax rates in 79 countries between 1996 and 2013
as described in Egger et al. (2015). For the corporate profit tax rate we use the maximum
corporate profit tax rate in a country and year.
– Figure 2 about here –
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the aforementioned tax rate for each year in the data,
using whisker-plots. The area around the median (a horizontal bar) indicated by a box refers
to the interquartile range (IQR), whereas the extended lines, the whiskers, indicate values
within a maximum of 1.5 times the IQR. The corporate profit tax rates in Figure 2 show a
relatively high degree of variability over time, even at the median.
– Table 2 about here –
Next, we provide summary statistics about the data used for empirical analysis in Table
2.14 Panel A of the table provides statistics about tax differentials. We observe nearly 22
thousand canton-origin-year pairs with positive tax differentials. This represents the case
where the foreign tax exceeds the tax of a Swiss canton. The reverse case covers roughly 8.7
canton-origin-year pairs. The average overall tax differential amounts to 4 percentage points,
11Alternatively, we have tried to match this sample with information about firm ownership from Bureau
van Dijk’s Orbis database, however this resulted in a very small number of matches (around 50).
12We have calculated productivities differently (according to the Ackerberg et al. (2015) and Gandhi et al.
(2016) methods, as well as turnover over the number of employees) to check the sensitivity of the results. The
corresponding results were unchanged.
13We use corporate profit tax rates for incorporated companies with capital and reserves of 2 million Swiss
Francs. The tax rates for ones with capital and reserves of 100 thousand Swiss Francs are basically unchanged.
14Note that the high sensitivity of the data do not allow us to illustrate summary statistics at more
disaggregated levels.
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whereas it is about 9 percentage points for pairs with I∆τ fct>0 and about 8 percentage points
(in absolute terms) for pairs with I∆τ fct<0. The corresponding maximum tax differentials
amount to 40 and 27 percentage points, respectively
Summary statistics about import transactions are reported in Panel B. We have collapsed
the data at the level of the firm, the exporter firm, the country of origin, product code (by HS
8-digit industry), as well as year.15 This reduces computational requirements as well as the
noise inherent in an analysis based on the use of every single import transaction as recorded
by the customs office. The resulting number of observations amounts to nearly 21 million.
Within these, we observe close to 400 thousand firms, importing 8.4 thousand products
from 1.7 million exporter firms located in 189 countries, in 10 years. A small proportion of
observations refers to intra-firm transactions (about 135 thousand). This is well in line with
patterns for other countries, but might also reflect in part the fact that we are only able
to determine firm relationships based on exporter and importer names, hence if an affiliate
carries a different firm name, this will be classified as an independent transaction in our
data. The log price and log quantity are similar, relatively widely dispersed, and amount to
3.5 on average. A further decomposition shows that intra-firm transactions have a higher
price unconditionally, and the quantities are also larger, irrespective of whether they stem
from a country that offers higher or lower taxes than a given Swiss canton.
Panel C illustrates statistics about log productivity as well as the number of observations in
the sample for which we can calculate this measure. We are able to do so for a little more
than 10% of the previous data.
5.2 Reduced form estimation
The first part of the empirical strategy is related to Davies et al. (2018) and Liu et al. (2017).
Precisely, we are interested in testing the predictions obtained in section 4 by way of reduced
form regressions. As described in the previous section, the unit of observation is an import
transaction, specific to the import of a good in product category k by importer firm i (located
in canton c) from exporting firm j (located in origin country f) in year t.16 The notation
illustrates that the data used is novel in its degree of detail, as we can observe import pair-
relationships at the product level, and exploit variation in regional taxes in addition to the
one in countries of origin. The price baseline regression is estimated as follows:
15We have tested the statistical patterns and the robustness of our empirical results to using monthly data
instead. This did not change the results in substantial ways. The results are reported in Appendix D.
16Because i is specific to c, and j to f , we simplify the notation accordingly.
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pijkt = γ1(I∆τ fct>0 ×∆τ fct) + γ2(I∆τ fct>0 ×MNEijt ×∆τ fct) + γ3(I∆τ fct<0 ×∆τ fct)
+ γ4(I∆τ fct<0 ×MNEijt ×∆τ fct) + κi(c)kf + λikt + µfkt + εijkt,
(22)
where pijkt is the log import price for each transaction of good k between firm i located in
a Swiss canton c, and a foreign firm j located in a country f , I∆τ fct>0 equals one if f ’s tax
rate is higher than c’s in t, I∆τ fct<0 equals one if f ’s tax rate is lower than c’s in t, MNEijt is
a binary variable which equals one if the transaction is intra-firm and zero if it is an arm’s
length transaction, ∆τ fct ≡ τ ft − τ ct measures the corporate tax rate differential between
country of origin f and canton c in t, and εijkt is the disturbance term. The fixed effects κi(c)kf,
λikt, and µfkt remove the bias from unobserved factors that affect prices (e.g., time-invariant
firm-product-origin factors accounting for trade costs such as distance, common language;
time-varying factors specific to the firm-product tuple such as productivity, quality and
size; and time-varying supply and demand shifters common to firms and cantons, such as
tariff and nontariff barriers, and most importantly, average product prices which we assume
are capturing appropriate ALP’s within sufficiently detailed product categories). The fixed
effects also account for the fact that multinational companies’ prices may have generally
lower levels (e.g., Bauer and Langenmayr, 2013). Essentially we are using the variation of
different transactions within a firm for a given product, origin and year to identify the effect
of differences in taxes on transactions with affiliates versus transactions at arm’s length, on
the price wedge. We cluster the standard errors by canton-origin-time to account for serial
correlation and correlation within canton-origin tuples.
The equation for log import quantities and volumes can be written analogously to (22).
Next we can adapt estimation of equation (22) to be based on the data containing firm-level
information from Amadeus. This leads to an equation which differs from (22) in the inclusion
of log productivity and takes the following form:
pijkt = δ1(MNEijt × φit) + δ2(I∆τ fct>0 ×MNEijt ×∆τ fct)
+ δ3(I∆τ fct>0 ×MNEijt ×∆τ fct × φit) + δ4(I∆τ fct<0 ×MNEijt ×∆τ fct)
+ δ5(I∆τ fct<0 ×MNEijt ×∆τ fct × φit) + ηi(c)kf + ξfkt + νijkt,
(23)
where φit is log productivity, and νijkt is the disturbance term. This equation includes the
interaction terms as predicted by the model in Section 4. These include the effect of produc-
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tivity for MNE transactions, the effect of the tax difference for MNE transactions, and the
triple interaction term of MNEijt, the tax wedge, and productivity. In contrast to eq. (22),
eq. (23) has to drop the fixed effects in the ikt dimension, as these are collinear with φit.
The equation for log quantity can be stated analogously.
5.3 Results
This section is structured as follows. We first report results from the estimation of eq. (22)
in Table 3. Next, we summarize results from estimating eq. (23) in Table 4. The results
from Table 3 allow us to proceed with an estimation of the structural parameters of eq. (24)
in the next section. With the results from Table 4 at hand we can verify the predictions
derived in section 4, about firm-level factors that determine intensive and extensive margin
transfer-pricing patterns.
– Table 3 here –
Panel A of Table 3 reports estimates for log prices, and panel B for log quantities. Columns 1–
3 and 5 condition on fixed effects in the ifk, fkt and ikt dimensions, whereas column 4 replaces
ifk by icfk. In column 1 we estimate the effect ∆τ fct for intra-firm transactions only, while we
also estimate the effects for transactions at arm’s length in the remaining columns. Column
3 reports results for firms that have a least one intra-firm import transaction. Column 5
reports results excluding imports of a number of products, including pharmaceutical products
– for instance, pricing of pharmaceutical products is heavily regulated, which might distort
our findings – and weapons.17 The corresponding results imply that for τ f > τ c and hence
∆τ fct > 0, a one percentage point increase in the tax wedge decreases the log price by 0.4%–
0.7%, while it increases the log price by 0.8%–0.9% for ∆τ fct < 0. The effects are mostly
insignificant at conventional levels for imports priced at arm’s length. This is expected as
the price with an independent party should not be affected by taxes. The analog effects for
log quantity as the dependent variable are equally significant statistically, and quantitatively
bigger, amounting to 2.4% for ∆τ fct > 0 and -5.3% to -5.6% for ∆τ fct < 0.
It should be noted that the estimates represent conservative estimates, because we are only
able to identify within-firm transactions based on importer and exporter names. If these
names differ, the transaction will be classified as an independent one. Yet still, the results
17We include only products falling under tariff codes (Zolltarife 39-92, 94, 95 and 96. Swiss tariff codes are
based on the HS classification.
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overall suggest that firms misprice their intra-firm transfers, and they do so more intensively
as the tax differential becomes larger. They also ship larger quantities from high-tax countries
and lower quantities from low-tax ones as the tax wedge increases. Given an average tax
differential of 9 percentage points with higher-tax countries, the price should thus decrease by
3.6% and the quantity should increase by 21.6%. With an average price of roughly 33 CHF
and an average quantity of about 35 (in kilograms), this implies that the average intra-firm
transaction price is lower by about 1.2 CHF, and the average quantity is higher by around
7.6 kilo. For low-tax countries (with an absolute average tax differential of 8 percentage
points), the results suggest that the transaction price is higher by about 2.1 CHF and the
quantity decreases by 15.4 kilos.
– Table 4 –
Table 4 reports results corresponding to the estimation of eq. (23), on a subsample of
firms for which we observe information necessary to calculate productivity. Again, panel
A illustrates results for log price as the dependent variable, and panel B shows those for
log quantity. All columns include coefficients for both the first- and second-order effects
for MNE transactions as derived in Section 4, by including interaction effects between the
MNE dummy, the tax differential, and log productivity. Thereby, the coefficients represent
the simple intra-firm slopes. This is in line with theory, which assumes that due to trade
costs, the only purpose of shipping inputs is tax avoidance. Column 1 estimates the baseline
regression, whereas column 2 focuses on firms with at least on intra-firm transaction, and
column 3 replaces the ifk with icfk fixed effects. Columns 4 and 5 report results based
on separate (i.e., non-pooled) regressions for the high- and low-tax cases, respectively, and
column 6 excludes products equivalent to column 5 of Table 3. Note that due to the inclusion
of productivity, the fixed effects varying in the ikt dimension cannot be included.
The results fully square with the theory predictions. We find a negative general productivity
effect for intra-firm transaction prices, yet this effect is insignificant except when focusing
solely on imports from high-tax countries. The sign of the coefficients is positive regarding
log quantities, where also the coefficients are statistically significant and amount to 0.5%–
6.7%. Again, the effect of the tax differential in panel A carries a negative sign, implying
that a one percentage point increase in the tax wedge decreases the log price by 2.1%–2.3%
for ∆τ fct > 0, while it increases the log price for ∆τ fct < 0, however the latter effects are
insignificant. The reverse holds for log quantities as illustrated in panel B, implying that a
one percentage point increase in the tax wedge augments the log quantity by 13.2%–13.5%
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for ∆τ fct > 0. Note that these findings are quantitatively larger than the ones shown in Table
3, which might be due to both sample selection and the exclusion of the ikt-specific fixed
effects. Finally, we find that the coefficients on the triple interaction term have a positive sign
regarding log prices, and a negative sign regarding log quantities for ∆τ fct > 0. Thus, more
productive firms deviate less from the arms’ length prices and ship smaller quantities. The
coefficients amount to 0.002 to 0.003 and -0.022 to -0.023, respectively, and are significant
statistically. This is particularly striking as the identification is complicated by the limited
variation of the variable φit over time. In contrast, this is not the case for ∆τ fct < 0.
One reason for this might be a greater focus of tax authorities on bigger (more productive)
MNEs trading with affiliates located in countries with big tax differentials. This would raises
their concealment costs relative to smaller firms and prevent big MNEs from using excessive
transfer pricing.
Overall our results imply that more productive firms’ intra-firm transaction prices deviate
less from their independent transactions, and they also ship lower quantities from affiliates,
which is in line with concealment costs (and also trade costs), making profit shifting costly.
– Figures 3 and 4 about here –
The interaction effects are best shown by way of a graphical illustration. We plot the tax
wedge against the linear prediction for log prices (LHS) and log quantity (RHS) in Figures
3 and 4.
Figure 3 confirms that the price of import transactions decreases with the tax differential,
but only significantly so for intra-firm transactions. Furthermore, the confidence intervals
of intra-firm versus arm’s length transactions do not overlap. The corresponding pattern is
similar yet with a positive sign regarding quantities, where the upward slope for intra-firm
transactions is even steeper than for log prices.
Figure 4 illustrates the effect of taxes for intra-firm transactions, evaluated at high versus
low productivity, which is measured at the mean +/- one standard deviation. Note that
we focus only on the case where the foreign tax is higher (∆τ fct > 0), as the results for
proved insignificant in Table 4. The left-hand side of the figure (log prices) illustrate that
the confidence intervals around the respective slopes are significant over the entire range of
the distribution of the tax differential only for low-productivity firms. For those, the slope is
also negative as opposed to the one of high-productivity firms, and towards the middle of the
distribution of tax differentials, the confidence intervals do not overlap. The right-hand side
of the figure (log quantity) shows that the slope for low-productivity firms is more or less flat
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and mostly insignificant, whereas the downward slope for high-productivity firms is steep
and significant over most parts of the distribution of the tax differential. The confidence
intervals don’t overlap again towards the middle of the distribution.
We test the robustness of these results as follows. We first exclude all tax havens used in
Davies et al., 2018. These include the Bahamas, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Cyprus, Hong
Kong, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, and Singapore. Next, we exclude all tax havens defined
in Hines and Rice, 1994. Third, we focus on the 87 parties that are signatory countries of the
OECD BEPS agreement as of 12 January 2019. Fourth, we focus on the set of EU countries
and exclude all other countries in the sample. The results are reported in Table 5. Overall,
they are strikingly similar in magnitude to the results shown in tables 3 and 4, while leading
to coefficients that display even higher levels of statistical significance.
5.4 Structural estimation
As a final step, we are interested in the parameters α and β of the concealment cost function,
which allows us to perform counter-factual analysis. The theoretical model allows us to
identify relationships that pin down these parameters, i.e., equations (15) and (19). We take
logs of the aforementioned equations which yields
log(xUf ) =
1
β − 1 log
(
(1− τd)− (1− τf )
)
− 1
β − 1 log (1− τf )
− 1
β − 1 log (α)−
α− 1
β − 1 log(pA − pU ) + u,
(24)
which can be used to identify α and β. Note that we need the deviation from the competitive
price, pA − pU , to estimate the parameters. In the previous section, we have employed
extensive fixed effects, which not only account for a variety of factors as described in the
previous subsection, but allow us to tease out the difference between intra-firm and ALP
import prices and quantities, because average firm-product-year prices and average origin-
product-year prices are accounted for by the fixed effects. We can thus construct the price
wedge pA − pU from the predicted prices resulting from regressions based on equation (22).
We use iceberg trade costs from Egger (2014).
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have developed a theoretical model of transfer pricing. Firms that shift
profits to low tax destinations face concealment costs and trade costs. The fixed part of the
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concealment cost function as well as the trade costs limit the number of firms (or possible
location of firms) that are able to use transfer pricing. The specific functional form of the
concealment cost function drives the intensive margin, i.e., the elasticity of the price wedge
and the quantity of goods shipped. We find that the profits shifted increase with firm
productivity, i.e., more productive firms deviate less from the arms’ length price, but ship
a larger quantity of goods. A greater tax differential increases profits shifting on average in
terms of price deviation and quantity. Prices decline on average by 0.4% to 0.7% if the tax
wedge increases by one percentage point, while the quantity increases by around 2.4%. Our
theoretical model is consistent with empirical findings from reduced form estimations using
Swiss transaction-level import data, as well as data about firm-level productivity. Finally, the
theoretical model allows to estimate a theory-consistent concealment cost function which can
be used for counterfactual analysis. Our findings are consistent with compliance (Jost et al.,
2014; Bauer and Langenmayr, 2013; Becker and Davies, 2014; Rathke, 2015) or managerial
incentives frameworks (Baldenius et al., 2004; Koethenbuerger and Stimmelmayr, 2015).
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Tables and figures
Figure 1: Condition for  to ensure transfer pricing.
1
∆𝜏𝜏
𝜖𝜖
UnderchargingOvercharging
No Transfer pricing
0
Note: We fix τd = 0.5 and only vary τf . We assume that α = 0.75 and β = 0.25. For  above the line,
transfer pricing is not feasible for firms, independent of their productivity.
Figure 2: Corporate profit tax. 79 countries, 1996 - 2011
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Note: For corporate profit taxes, we utilize the maximum tax rate levied at the national level on
corporate profit in a country of residence. In federal states, the total corporate tax rate is calculated
as the weighted average of the local (sub-national) taxes combined with federal tax rates (e.g., for
Germany or Canada as reported by the OECD) or the tax rate prevailing in the economic center
(e.g. for Switzerland, where the rates of the canton of Zurich are taken). The primary sources for
corporate profit tax rates are the following: Ernest and Young Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide 1998-
2012; Coopers and Lybrand International Tax Summaries 1996-1997; International Bureau of Fiscal
Documentation Global Corporate Tax Handbook 2007-2012; Price Waterhouse Coopers Corporate Taxes
- Worldwide Summaries 1999-2000, 2001-2003, 2012-2013; OECD www.taxfoundation.org.
Figure 3: Effect of tax for intra-firm versus arm’s length transactions on log prices
and log quantities of import transactions
Notes: The figures plot the effect of taxes (for different percentiles of the distribution of the tax differential) for
intra-firm versus arm’s length transactions.
Figure 4: Effect of tax for high- versus low-productivity firms on log prices and log
quantities of import transactions
Notes: The figures plot the effect of taxes firms with high (mean plus one standard deviation) versus low (mean minus
one standard deviation) firms.
Table 1: Corporate tax rates in Switzerland, 2015
Lucerne 13.63 St. Gallen 17.40
Nidwalden 12.73 Aargau 17.25
Obwalden 14.16 Fribourg 21.86
Appenzell A. 13.55 Ticino 22.55
Appenzell I. 14.16 Basle-Land 20.73
Zug 13.87 Jura 23.31
Schwyz 14.86 Zurich 21.15
Uri 15.12 Valais 19.76
Glarus 17.44 Berne 20.49
Schaffhausen 17.40 Solothurn 19.64
Thurgau 16.43 Basle 24.79
Grisons 19.94 Vaud 22.79
Neuchâtel 17.31 Geneva 24.67
Notes: Taxes (cantonal, municipality, church and federal taxes) in % of net profits, average over all yield classes, for
incorporated companies with capital and reserves of 2 million Swiss Francs. The tax burden is calculated for the
cantonal capital. Source: ESTV.
Table 2: Summary statistics
Mean SD Min Max
A. Statistics on taxes
Pairs cft with I∆τ fct>0 21,773
Pairs cft with I∆τ fct<0 8,777
∆τ fct 4.159 9.782 -26.715 39.750
∆τ fct (I∆τ fct>0) 9.081 5.562 0.026 39.750
∆τ fct (I∆τ fct<0) -8.050 6.871 -26.715 -0.001
B. Statistics on import transactions
No. Firms 397,485
No. Cantons 26
No. Products 8,401
No. Exporters 1,789,852
No. Origins 189
No. Years 10
MNEijt 134,470
Non-MNEijt 20,587,479
Log price 3.491 2.120 -14.000 23.556
Log quantity 3.553 3.193 -6.908 20.572
Log price for MNEijt (I∆τ fct>0) 3.588 1.963 -7.544 20.129
Log price for non-MNEijt (I∆τ fct>0) 3.458 2.129 -14.000 23.556
Log quantity for MNEijt (I∆τ fct>0) 4.137 3.038 -6.908 17.060
Log quantity for non-MNEijt (I∆τ fct>0) 3.672 3.205 -6.908 20.572
Log price for MNEijt (I∆τ fct<0) 3.645 1.964 -9.944 19.909
Log price for non-MNEijt (I∆τ fct<0) 3.627 2.079 -12.192 23.085
Log quantity for MNEijt (I∆τ fct<0) 3.764 2.998 -6.908 17.151
Log quantity for non-MNEijt (I∆τ fct<0) 3.033 3.094 -6.908 19.746
Observations 20,721,949
C. Firm-level statistics
Log productivity (φit) 7.220 1.434 -0.308 14.922
Observations with φit 2,251,885
Notes: Tax statistics stem from the Federal Tax Administration ESTV, and Egger et al., 2015. The import summary
statistics correspond to data pooled by firm (i), canton (c), product (k), exporter firm (j), origin (f ) and year (t)
over the period 2006-2015 for import transactions obtained from the Swiss Federal Customs Administration (EZV,
Oberzolldirektion). Log price refers to the unit value, calculated as the log of volume divided by quantity on data
containing observations about single transactions. The data correspond to a match of trade transactions data with
Amadeus firm-level data from Bureau van Dijk. Log φit is calculated according to Petrin et al. (2004).
Table 3: Effect of taxes on prices and quantities of intra-firm versus
arm’s length import transactions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Log price
I∆τ fct>0 ×∆τ fct 0.002 0.008* 0.003 0.001
(0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002)
I∆τ fct>0 ×MNEijt ×∆τ fct -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
I∆τ fct<0 ×∆τ fct 0.003* 0.012** 0.004 0.003
(0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002)
I∆τ fct<0 ×MNEijt ×∆τ fct 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Obs. 20,721,949 20,721,949 6,598,142 20,626,913 13,855,001
Fixed effects ifk 3,167,558 3,167,558 783,917 3,168,404 2,269,681
Fixed effects fkt 462,628 462,628 296,559 461,886 342,468
Fixed effects ikt 5182979 5182979 1321395 5154631 3765725
No. cl. 23,165 23,165 18,708 23,100 17,809
R2 0.839 0.839 0.814 0.840 0.869
B. Log quantity
I∆τ fct>0 ×∆τ fct -0.001 -0.016 0.009 -0.005
(0.005) (0.014) (0.010) (0.007)
I∆τ fct>0 ×MNEijt ×∆τ fct 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
I∆τ fct<0 ×∆τ fct -0.004 -0.017 0.007 -0.010
(0.005) (0.013) (0.010) (0.007)
I∆τ fct<0 ×MNEijt ×∆τ fct -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.056*** -0.056*** -0.053***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
Obs. 20,721,949 20,721,949 6,598,142 20,626,913 13,855,001
Fixed effects ifk 3,167,558 3,167,558 783,917 3,168,404 2,269,681
Fixed effects fkt 462,628 462,628 296,559 461,886 342,468
Fixed effects ikt 5182979 5182979 1321395 5154631 3765725
No. cl. 23,165 23,165 18,708 23,100 17,809
R2 0.817 0.817 0.777 0.818 0.779
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All equations are estimated
by pooled OLS with absorbed fixed effects (ifk importer-origin-product, fkt origin-product-year, ikt importer-product-
year), and standard errors clustered at the level of canton-origin-year. Dependent variables: log unit value per import
transaction (log price) and log quantity per import transaction (log quantity), based on data aggregated at the level of
firm-canton-product-exporter-origin-year. Regressions in (1) include the interaction term only; (2) estimates eq. (22);
(3) estimates eq. (22), based on firms that have at least one MNE transaction; (4) employs icfk (importer-canton-
origin-product) instead of ifk (importer-origin-product) fixed effects; (5) reports results based on EZV product numbers
(Tarifnummern) 39-92, 94, 95 and 96.
Table 4: Effect of taxes and productivity on prices and quantities of
intra-firm versus arm’s length import transactions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Log price
MNEijt × φit -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.008*** -0.005 -0.007
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005)
I∆τ fct>0 ×MNEijt ×∆τ fct -0.022*** -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.021***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008)
I∆τ fct>0 ×MNEijt ×∆τ fct × φit 0.003** 0.003*** 0.003** 0.003*** 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
I∆τ fct<0 ×MNEijt ×∆τ fct 0.022 0.024 0.014 0.023 0.025
(0.068) (0.070) (0.069) (0.057) (0.098)
I∆τ fct<0 ×MNEijt ×∆τ fct × φit -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.001
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.013)
Obs. 2,657,561 1,080,056 2,650,654 2,657,561 2,657,561 1,994,067
Fixed effects ifk 551,650 192,562 551,429 551,650 551,650 440,423
Fixed effects fkt 135,442 83,297 135,272 135,442 135,442 107,199
No. cl. 8,040 5,863 7,978 6,041
R2 0.821 0.794 0.821 0.821 0.821 0.837
B. Log quantity
MNEijt × φit 0.061** 0.060** 0.062** 0.005** 0.059*** 0.067**
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.002) (0.005) (0.027)
I∆τ fct>0 ×MNEijt ×∆τ fct 0.132*** 0.135*** 0.132*** 0.132*** 0.132***
(0.047) (0.048) (0.047) (0.008) (0.051)
I∆τ fct>0 ×MNEijt ×∆τ fct × φit -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.023***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.001) (0.008)
I∆τ fct<0 ×MNEijt ×∆τ fct -0.152 -0.160 -0.149 -0.145 -0.195
(0.122) (0.121) (0.123) (0.095) (0.215)
I∆τ fct<0 ×MNEijt ×∆τ fct × φit 0.022 0.023 0.022 0.016 0.026
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.012) (0.026)
Obs. 2,657,561 1,080,056 2,650,654 2,657,561 2,657,561 1,994,067
Fixed effects ifk 551,650 192,562 551,429 551,650 551,650 440,423
Fixed effects fkt 135,442 83,297 135,272 135,442 135,442 107,199
No. cl. 8,040 5,863 7,978 6,041
R2 0.792 0.758 0.792 0.792 0.792 0.755
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All equations are estimated
by pooled OLS with absorbed fixed effects (ifk importer-origin-product, fkt origin-product-year), and standard errors
clustered at the level of canton-origin-year. Dependent variables: log unit value per import transaction (log price)
and log quantity per import transaction (log quantity), based on data aggregated at the level of firm-canton-product-
exporter-origin-year. Regressions in (1) estimates eq. (23); (2) estimates eq. (23), based on firms that have at least
one MNE transaction; (3) employs icfk (importer-canton-origin-product) instead of ifk (importer-origin-product) fixed
effects; (4) focuses on ∆τ fct > 0; (5) focuses on ∆τ fct < 0; and (6) reports results based on EZV product numbers
(Tarifnummern) 39-92, 94, 95 and 96.
Table 5: Robustness analysis of the effect of taxes and productivity on
prices and quantities of intra-firm versus arm’s length import transac-
tions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Log price
I∆τfct<0 ×∆τ fct 0.003* 0.003* 0.004** 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
I∆τfct>0 ×∆τ fct 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
I∆τfct<0 ×MNEijt ×∆τ fct 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.010***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
I∆τfct>0 ×MNEijt ×∆τ fct -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
MNEijt × φit -0.005 -0.005 -0.008* -0.008
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
I∆τfdt>0 ×MNEijt ×∆τ fdt -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.029*** -0.029***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
I∆τfdt<0 ×MNEijt ×∆τ fdt 0.088* 0.086 0.012 0.150
(0.051) (0.053) (0.071) (0.112)
I∆τfdt>0 ×MNEijt ×∆τ fdt × φit 0.003** 0.003** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
I∆τfdt<0 ×MNEijt ×∆τ fdt × φit -0.015** -0.015** -0.003 -0.019
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.016)
Obs. 20,356,616 20,348,845 19,523,418 17,980,279 2,619,117 2,618,732 2,537,568 2,375,701
Fixed effects ifk 3,093,649 3,091,626 2,966,098 2,704,327 542,633 542,500 525,232 491,437
Fixed effects fkt 447,905 446,851 418,161 336,022 132,145 132,035 125,811 108,920
No. cl. 21,604 20,577 15,402 6,804 7,433 7,315 6,518 3,584
R2 0.838 0.838 0.839 0.834 0.820 0.820 0.820 0.817
B. Log quantity
I∆τfct<0 ×∆τ fct -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.007
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
I∆τfct>0 ×∆τ fct -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
I∆τfct<0 ×MNEijt ×∆τ fct -0.054*** -0.055*** -0.056*** -0.059***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
I∆τfct>0 ×MNEijt ×∆τ fct 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.020*** 0.020***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
MNEijt × φit 0.061** 0.061** 0.095*** 0.105***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.032) (0.033)
I∆τ fdt > 0×MNEijt ×∆τ fdt 0.132*** 0.132*** 0.156*** 0.159***
(0.047) (0.047) (0.053) (0.054)
I∆τ fdt < 0×MNEijt ×∆τ fdt -0.253** -0.266** -0.119 -0.115
(0.112) (0.117) (0.113) (0.175)
I∆τ fdt > 0×MNEijt ×∆τ fdt × φit -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.029*** -0.030***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010)
I∆τ fdt < 0×MNEijt ×∆τ fdt × φit 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.023 0.030
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018)
Obs. 20,356,616 20,348,845 19,523,418 17,980,279 2,619,117 2,618,732 2,537,568 2,375,701
Fixed effects ifk 3,093,649 3,091,626 2,966,098 2,704,327 542,633 542,500 525,232 491,437
Fixed effects fkt 447,905 446,851 418,161 336,022 132,145 132,035 125,811 108,920
No. cl. 21,604 20,577 15,402 6,804 7,433 7,315 6,518 3,584
R2 0.817 0.817 0.816 0.812 0.791 0.791 0.790 0.786
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All equations are estimated by pooled
OLS with absorbed fixed effects (ift, ifk importer-origin-product, fkt origin-product-year in Columns 1–4, and ifk importer-origin-
product, fkt origin-product-year in Columns 5–8), and standard errors clustered at the level of canton-origin-year. Columns 1–4
exclude productivity, and columns 5–8 include productivity. Dependent variables: log unit value per import transaction (log price)
and log quantity per import transaction (log quantity), based on data aggregated at the level of firm-canton-product-exporter-
origin-year. Regressions in (1) and (5), excluding the tax havens as in Davies et al., 2018; (2) and (6) exclude the tax havens as
in Hines and Rice, 1994; (3) and (7) focus on countries which adhere to the OECD BEPS framework; and (4) and (8) are based
on EU countries only.
A Expected fines of tax evasion
In this section we derive the proposed concealment cost functions in equations (1) and (2)
from the optimal behavior of a tax authority that maximizes expected tax revenues. Without
loss of generality we focus only on the undercharging case. Deriving the concealment cost
function for the overcharging case follows analogously. The tax authority decides how many
revenue officers it wants to employ to audit a parent firm given some ex-ante observable
variables. The detection probability of illegal transfer pricing increases with the price wedge
between the competitive arm’s length price and the undercharging price. Both taken as
given from the perspective of the tax authority. Moreover, the probability increases (for a
given price wedge) with the number of revenue officers are employed at the audit of the firm.
We assume that the tax authority randomly audit firms, but a firm is selected for an audit
the tax authority can costlessly observe the price wedge and the traded quantity. Still the
tax authority has to confirm that the firm indeed applies illegal transfer pricing. Thus, the
expected tax revenues, ET , from an audit are
ET =
(
L(pA − pU )ς
L(pA − pU )ς + 1
)
(τf (pA − pU )xfϕ)− wL, (25)
where the first parenthesis gives the detection probability as a function of revenue officers
employed, the price wedge, and an elasticity parameter ς > 0. The second parenthesis
corresponds to the evaded tax revenues multiplied by a fine markup, ϕ > 1, and wL are the
wage costs of revenue officers.
The optimal amount of tax officers is given by
L(pA − pU )ς + 1 =
(
τfxϕ(pA − pU )ς+1
w
) 1
2
. (26)
Assume that the probability of a firm to get audited is LML , where L is the (inelastic)
total number of tax officers at the tax authority and M is the total number of firms in the
economy that the tax authority could audit. Then the expected fine from the perspective
can be written as
EΠ =
L
ML
L(pA − pU )ς
L(pA − pU )ς + 1τf (pA − pU )xfϕ =
L
M
(xϕτf )
1
2 (pA − pU )
ς+1
2 , (27)
where we substituted the optimal number of tax officers from equation (26). This is equiv-
alent to the concealment costs function in equation (1), scaled by LM (ϕτf )
1
2 , and β = ς+12 ,
and α = 12 .
B Overcharging MNE
If the tax rate in the domestic country is higher than in the foreign country τd > τf , firms
have incentives to shift profits to the foreign country and thus the foreign affiliate overcharges
the domestic firm, pO > 1/φ. Total net profits are
piO(ω) =(1− τd)
(
p(ω)y(ω)− xd
φ
− pOxf
)
+ (1− τf )
(
pO − 1
φ
)
xf
−(1− τd)(pO − pA)αxβf )− FO − F.
(28)
The first order conditions of the firm’s maximization problem are:
∂piO(ω)
∂xd
=E − 2(xd + xf )− 1
φ
= 0,
∂piO(ω)
∂xf
=(1− τd)(E − 2(xd + xf )− pO) + (1− τf )
(
pO − 1
φ
)
− (1− τd)βxβ−1f (pO − pA)α = 0,
∂piO(ω)
∂pO
=− (1− τd)xf + (1− τf )xf − (1− τd)α(pO − pA)α−1xβf = 0
Solving for the optimal pO yields
pO =
β
β − α
(
pA +
α
β
τd − τf
φζ
)
. (29)
Note that the overcharging price is higher than the arms’ length price if ζ ≤ 0. This is the
case if
 <
1− τf
1− τd , (30)
where the RHS is greater than one as τd > τf . Similarly to the undercharging case trans-
portation costs limit transfer pricing if the tax differential is too small.
Similar to the undercharging case we derive the comparative statics for overcharging:
∂pO/∂φ < 0, ∂pO/∂ < 0,
∂pO/∂τf < 0, ∂pO/∂τd > 0, ∂2pU/∂τf∂φ > 0,
where we use that for pA = 1φ , α > β and ζ < 0 to ensure that pO >
1
φ . In the overcharging
case high-productivity firms increase the transfer price less than low-productivity firms.
Solving for xf yields
xOf =
( (1− τf )− (1− τd)
(1− τd)α(pO − pA)α−1
) 1
β−1
. (31)
Again substituting pO from equation (17) yields the equilibrium traded quantity:
xOf =
 −ζ
(1− τf )α
(
α
α−β
(
pA + τd−τfφζ)
))α−1

1
β−1
. (32)
Again, bigger firms trade more goods at a smaller price differential relative to the competitive
price. Moreover, ∂xOf /∂τd > 0 and ∂xOf /∂τf < 0, which implies that a higher tax difference
leads to increased imports of the over-priced foreign inputs. The cutoff productivity can be
determined analogously to the undercharging case.
C Proofs
C.1 Undercharging price condition
The undercharging price as defined by equation (13) will always satisfy the following inequal-
ities:
0 ≤ pU ≤ pA,
if pA = 1φ , trade costs  > 1, α > β and ζ > 0 As by definition of the undercharging case
τd < τf it is easy to show that ζ > 0. The undercharging price is lower than the ALP if
pU − pA < 0,
α
β − α
(
β
αpA −
τf−τd
φζ
)
− pA < 0
,
where we use that pA = 1φ . Simplifying yields
α
β − α
(
1− τf − τd
ζ
)
> 0,
using that α > β yields
ζ > τf − τd,
after substituting ζ and simplifying this gives
1 > τd,
which holds by definition of τd ∈ [0, 1].
C.2 Comparative statics
Equation (13) defines the undercharging price. The price deviation is given by
pA − pU = 1
φ
− β
β − α
1
φ
+ τf − τd
ζφ
α
β − α.
Price derivatives:
∂pA − pU
∂φ
< 0.
− 1
φ2
+ β
β − α
1
φ2
− τf − τd
ζφ2
α
β − α < 0.
Given that α > β we have that
−(β − α) + β − τf − τd
ζ
α > 0.
Simplifying yields
τf − τd > −ζ,
which always holds as ζ > 0 and τd < τf in the undercharging case. More productive firms
deviate less from the ALP.
The cross-derivative of the price differential with respect to productivity and the tax rate
differential is given by
∂2pA − pU
∂φ∂τd
= 1
φ2
α
β − α
−∂ τf−τdζ
∂τd
 .
It is easy to show that
−∂
τf−τd
ζ
∂τd
= −ζ + (τf − τd)
ζ2
,
which after some simplification yields
(1− )(1− τd)
ζ2
< 0.
As α > β the cross derivative is negative, i.e.,
∂2pA − pU
∂φ∂τd
< 0,
as the tax differential decreases the price deviation increases with productivity.
The price deviation with respect to trade costs increase, i.e.,
∂pA − pU
∂
> 0,
as
α
β − α
τf − τd
φ
(
−1− τd
ζ2
)
< 0,
and α > β.
Quantity derivatives: To derive the relationship between the undercharging optimal quantity
and firm productivity we use equation (15). From above we know that
∂pA − pU
∂φ
< 0.
If 1 < β < α than it is straightforward to see that
∂xUf
∂φ
> 0,
and more productive firm use larger quantities to shift profits.
∂XUf
∂τd
= 1
β − 1(x
U
f )
1
β−1−1
[
−((1− τf )α(pA − pU )α−1)− ( (1− τd)(1− )(1− τd)− (1− τf ))α(α− 1)(pA − pU )
α−2∂(pA − pU
∂τd
]
xUf =
(
(1− τd)− (1− τf )
(1− τf )α(pA − pU )α−1
) 1
β−1
. (33)
Substituting the optimal undercharging price, pU , from equation (13) yields
xUf =
 (1− τd)− (1− τf )
(1− τf )α
(
α
α−β
(
pA − τf−τdφζ
))α−1

1
β−1
. (34)
D Data appendix
Table 6: Capital tax burden on holdings in cantonal capitals in Switzer-
land, 2015 in CHF
Lucerne 500 St. Gallen 1005
Nidwalden 500 Aargau 845
Obwalden 500 Fribourg 651
Appenzell A. 900 Ticino 975
Appenzell I. 500 Basle-Land 308
Zug 374 Jura 630
Schwyz 398 Zurich 687
Uri 500 Valais 400
Glarus 500 Berne 728
Schaffhausen 210 Solothurn 656
Thurgau 837 Basle 1000
Grisons 300 Vaud 3503
Neuchâtel 20 Geneva 1336
Notes: Capital tax burden for holdings with capital and reserves of 2 million Swiss Francs with net profit of 160
thousand Francs. The tax burden is calculated for the cantonal capital. Source: ESTV.
